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Time and adaptation
The Concept of Time in Rehabilitation and Psychosocial Adaptation to Chronic
Illness and Disability
Arguably, the most enigmatic of all human experiences may be the perception of
time. Yet, time has also been viewed as the essence of human existence (Bergson, 1971;
Kelly, 1955), as universally human (Doob, 1971), and as permeating all of human
experience (Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Melges, 1982). According to Zimbardo and Boyd
(2008), time is the most common English noun (whereas year and day are ranked third
and fifth, respectively). Time is also intimately interwoven into the most fundamental
human perceptions of the internal and external worlds, such as causality, change, growth,
maturation, order, self-awareness, and goal directedness (Frank, 1939; James, 1890;
Kafka, 1973; Melges, 1982; Slife, 1993). It is therefore of ultimate importance for the
meaning and significance we assign to events, objects, and other people (Sherover, 1975).
Still, many centuries of philosophical and psychological speculation and research
have failed to resolve the ultimate time-related question, namely, is time a product of the
mind (i.e., it is internally-derived, linked to one level of consciousness, and therefore
phenomenologically-experienced) as Plato, Immanuel Kant, and Georg F. C. Hegel
claimed, or is it rooted in the external world and, as such, is absolute and a product of the
universe at large as Rene Descartes, John Locke, and Isaac Newton argued. Regardless,
time is the prima facie of perceiving and experiencing nature. It is the, according to Kant,
universal and fundamental form of all human sensibility. Indeed, it is that sui generis
concept that is found not only between all events but mostly within all events, and as
such is inseparable from space (Davies, 1995; Greene, 2004; Sherover, 1975).
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Time also plays an immeasurably important role during rehabilitation and
adaptation to chronic illness and disability (CID). It has been linked, both indirectly and
directly, to such concepts as: the process of adaptation (e.g., the arguable existence of
universal or individual-linked stages or phases of adaptation), coping with CID-triggered
stresses (e.g., anticipatory coping, coping with presently experienced crises, coping with
the aftermath of CID), response shift models regarding reconstruction of past experiences
and perceptions, and the impact of psychiatric disabilities (e.g., anxiety, depression,
schizophrenia, personality disorders) on time orientation. To better appreciate how the
understanding of time and its various aspects can facilitate the understanding of
psychosocial adaptation to CID, the present two-part paper first seeks to (a) provide a
brief review of the nature and structure of time and (b) explore the role that time plays in
personality theories and therapeutic approaches. These areas are examined in part I of the
paper. In part II the discussion reverts to a more rehabilitation-oriented domain and,
accordingly, the second part: (a) briefly explores the literature on time, death, adaptation,
and coping, (b)reviews the literature on the relationships between time and
psychopathology, and (c) concludes with discussion of the complex relationships
between the passage of time and psychosocial adaptation to CID, including a brief
synopsis of interventions modalities recommended for time distortions.
The Nature and Structure of Time
Humans typically view the concept of time as reflecting three separate, albeit
dynamically interconnected, phases, namely, past, present and future. The complex
interplay among these three phases can be appreciated from the fact that an event that has
not yet occurred (future), is destined to be experienced at a certain point of time (present),
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and eventually it fades into memory (past). Put differently, personal experiences,
although belonging to all three time perspectives, ultimately are anchored in one only, the
past. This unavoidable phenomenon stems from the simple order of life events, that
whereas the future is “unknown” and certainly unpredictable, and is mostly fraught with
either positive (e.g. hope, fantasies) or negative (e.g., anxiety, dread) anticipation, and the
present is evanescent and continuously changing, the past, as the reservoir in which
memories dwell, affords the individual the stability and immutability of reassessing life
events (Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Doob, 1971; Frank, 1939; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008).
Hartocollis (1972) further suggested that whereas the future can only be understood in
terms of “potentialities” and is therefore avoidable to a degree, it is also the harbinger of
anxiety. The past, in contrast, reflects events that have already occurred. It is therefore an
inescapable and unavoidable finality. As such, it is often associated with experiences of
depression and guilt (e. g., grieving lost opportunities, unfulfilled relationships, physical
abilities).
The passage of time, however, transcends any simplistic efforts of demarcation
into these three primary phases. Regardless of how static or dynamic this tri-modal
separation of time is, or how reasonable it appears to be, it still masks some very
important and complementary influences among its aspects. For example, a distinction is
often made between objective and subjective time (Adam, 1990; Edlund, 1987;
Hartocollis, 1972; Henley et al., 2003; Melges, 1982; Pollock, 1971; Rappaport, 1990;
Slife, 1993; Whitrow, 1987/2003). Objective time is typically equated with geophysical,
public, rational, measureable clock-based, Newtonian time*. This time is conceived for
the most part as linear (“the arrow of time”), continuous, uniform, universal, and
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reductionist (for a comprehensive review of the assumptions underlying objective time,
the reader is referred to Slife, 1993). This time exists independently of human
consciousness. Still, even objective time is not viewed uniformly by all. Whereas
classical, deterministic (i.e., both Newton’s and Einstein’s) physics posit that the past
and the future are solidly anchored into the present, quantum mechanics is based on a set
of laws maintaining that predicting events in the future can only be probabilistically
envisioned and occurrences of the past can only be probabilistically reconstructed
(Greene, 2004).
Subjective time, in contrast, may be conceptualized as non-uniform, internallydetermined; private; experiential; affected by fleeting perceptions, emotions, and
cognitions; is inherently elastic; and is partially determined by socio-cultural influences
and values (Adam, 1990; Edlund, 1987; Melges, 1982; Slife, 1993). It is therefore, “felt
time”. Accordingly, within subjective or psychological time, the experience of duration
and flow of time may be shortened or extended, sequencing and ordering of events may
be reversed, and as often experienced, thought processes can reverse to accommodate
past events as well as be launched forward into the future (Frank, 1939; Melges, 1982;
Piaget, 1969). Subjective time, therefore, does not conform to the more traditional orderly
yet simplistic linear progression of clock time (past → present → future), but instead
allows for a complex and often unpredictable interaction among various time aspects.
The past, within the contest of subjective time is not a passive and immutable reservoir of
memories but a sizzling and dynamic platform that is continuously changing as reemerging personal recollections reinterpret its contents (Berger, 1963; Cottle &
Klineberg, 1974; Edlund, 1987). In a similar vein, anticipation and expectation of future
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events, both positive (e.g., hopes, desires) and negative (e.g., fears, concerns), may affect
the perception of meaningfulness of the present time as they serve to motivate or stagnate
certain experiences and behaviors, and even the interpretation and reorganization of the
past (Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Edlund, 1987; Frank, 1939). Subjective time, then, is
influenced by psychological defense mechanisms such as repression, distortion and
denial (Pollock, 1971). It further allows us to project our lives into the future and also
trace it back into the past (Edlund, 1987). As such, subjective time and meanings
attributed to time-linked concepts are influenced by, and change with, age and life stage
(Fingerman & Perlmutter, 2001; Lang & Carstensen, 2002; Lessing, 1972; Lomarz,
Friedman, Gitter, Shmotkin, & Medini, 1985; Mello & Worrell, 2006; Shmotkin, 1991;
Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), social factors such as social goals and social comparisons
(Carstensen, Isaacowitz & Charles, 1999; Jonas & Huguet, 2008) ; and even employment
status (Feather & Bond, 1983; Bond & Feather, 1988; Martz, 2003). The subjective
assessment of time has also been theorized to be linked to the type and extension of
personal goals, such that expansive appraisal of the future is associated with the selection
of long-term goals, notably the pursuit of knowledge-based goals while focus on the
present is related to the selection of short-term goals, mostly of the affective domain,
including emotional meaningfulness and satisfaction (Carstensen et al., 1999). It is also
affected by and linked to a variety of personality characteristics (e.g., Type A personality,
aggressiveness, self-esteem, ego control, optimism, motivation; Bond & Feather, 1988;
Carstensen et al., 1999; Wessman, 1973) and psychiatric conditions such as anxiety,
depression, schizophrenia and certain personality disorders (Doob, 1971; Edlund, 1987;
Melges, 1982; Rappaport, 1990; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999, 2008). Renowned physicists
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such as Albert Einstein and Roger Penrose also recognized the existence of subjective
(inner, psychological) time, as a separate entity from objective (outer, physical) time
(Davies, 1995). Einstein further viewed time as an intellectual creation of the human
mind that serves the purpose of inter-linking life experiences (Slife, 1993).
Finally, the experience of time as a primary psychological functioning has been
studied from four separate vantage points. These include: (a) Time Perception, which
focuses on the individual’s ability to estimate or reproduce predetermined time units
(several seconds, minutes, etc.); (b) Time Orientation, which focuses on the person’s
preference for temporal direction or orientation (i.e., past, present, or future); (c) Time
Perspective, which focuses on one’s timing and ordering of typically long-ranged
(extended) personalized events, such as the projection of oneself into any of the three
temporal dimensions and, therefore, functions as a mediator between the present and self
and that of the past or future; and (d) Time Attitude, which reflects the person’s attitude
(negative, positive, neutral) toward the past, present, and future (Dilling & Rabin, 1967;
Drakulic, Tenjovic, & Lecic-Tosevski, 2003; Frank, 1939; Kastenbaum, 1964; Nuttin,
1985; Wallace, 1956; Wallace & Rabin, 1960). In research and practice, however, it
should be mentioned that clear distinctions among the above points of departure have
often been blurred if not ignored all together.
Linear and Cyclical Time
The belief that time progresses in a linear fashion is one of the primary
cornerstones of Newtonian physics and Western civilization. This notion was espoused
by such philosophers as John Locke (the objectivistic view of linear time or time that
exists in the external environment), Emanuel Kant (the subjectivist or phenomenological
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view of linear time or time that exists inside one’s mind, and Leibnitz (the notion that
both time and space are relative and can be ordered such that the former is a universal
order of change while the latter is the order of co-existing objects (Sherover, 1975; Slife,
1993). In contrast, the belief in cyclical time has often been linked to the rhythm of
earthly phenomena (the annual seasons) and celestial objects (the periodicity of stars and
planets in the night sky). The conflicting views regarding time’s linear vs. cyclical nature,
in addition to being firmly entrenched in models of the presumed origin and end of the
universe**, have also exerted a covert, yet omnipotent psychological impact on the
relative importance of the past and the future. The past assumes a special and important
role in cyclical models as it is often believed to repeat itself, while the future is accorded
a prominent role in linear models as it points mainly in one direction (Whitrow,
1972/2003).
CID applications. The contrast between linear and cyclical time is prominently featured
in the various models of psychosocial adaptation to CID, all of which heavily rely upon
the notion that adaptation is a dynamic, unfolding and continuous temporal process
(Livneh & Parker, 2005; Smedema et al., 2009). Earlier models of psychosocial
adaptation emphasized the linearity of the adaptation process (i.e., the so-called “stage”
or “phase” models) by maintaining that, following the onset of CID, the ensuing process
is predictably composed of universal, uniform and trans-condition psychological
experiences, reactions , or responses. It was further assumed that more distally
experienced reactions, following CID onset, are securely predicated upon, and orderly
follow, the emergence of more proximally experienced reactions. Although not directly
addressed by the proponents of these models, it is assumed that it is psychological,
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internally-determined time (rather than objective, rational time) that is at the root of these
experienced reactions, their pace, and overall duration. These models, by their very
nature, paid little or no heed to spatial (environmental) influences that may interact with
these internally-driven reactions.
Cyclical (often referred to also as pendular) models of adaptation to CI, although
far less encountered in the literature, have generally sought to address the clinical
references to those observed alterations in experiences, as well as ‘identities” of people
with CID. These alterations have spanned the gamut of viewing oneself as healthy vs. ill,
disabled vs. nondisabled, engaging in adaptive vs. non-adaptive behaviors, and
manifesting coping vs. succumbing attitudes (Charmaz, 1995; Wright, 1983; Yoshida,
1993). According to the pendular models the process of adaptation is comprised of a
gradual evolution and reconstruction of one’s identity to accommodate the gained
awareness of bodily changes and imposed functional limitations. Adaptation, therefore,
does not follow a linear, ordered process but a complex, swing-like series of assimilated
experiences and evolving emotions and cognitions.
In sum, then, the various sets of models of psychosocial adaptation differ from
one another in their efforts to explain those psychological trajectories assumed to ensue
following the onset of CID. The notion of time or, more specifically, that of experiential
unfolding, accordingly, occupies a paramount role in the development of these
models***.
Time, Space and Change
Time, or more accurately the passage of time, can only be experienced through
changes that occur within it (Cottle & Klineberg; 1974; Sherover, 1975; Whitrow,
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1972/2003). Indeed, time has been referred to as the “gatekeeper” or “bookkeeper” of
change (Greene, 2004). Regardless if these changes follow a repetitive (cyclical) or
progressive (linear, unidirectional) trend, time nevertheless “binds the direction of
change” (Sherover, 1975, p. 18). As such, time is intimately linked with the motion of
causal ordering or sequencing, and with the concepts of developmental stages and
unfolding growth processes. An inherent characteristic of time is therefore that it
continually negates the present and creating past of it. This continuity of present negation
is what causes change to occur and be perceived as such. Moreover, it negates the “no
longer” actual past and similarly the “not yet” actual future (Georg Wilhelm Hegel, in
Sherover, 1975). Other philosophers (e.g., Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Robin George
Collingwood, in Sherover, 1975) have maintained that past and future do not really exist
but are merely psychic projections or ideals of humans’ perception of the world around
them. Only the present, as ephemeral as it may be, exists. Yet, the present is,
undoubtedly, influenced by both past recollections and future expectations.
Time, in its reflection of change through present negation and, therefore,
sequencing of physical or mental events must also be directly linked to the concept of
space (i.e., the external world) as the latter is the bedrock of all observed changes. Indeed,
such joint time-space (often termed spacetime) attributions have been posited by
philosophers (Kant, Locke, Leibnitz, Alexander), psychologists (Carl G. Jung, Kurt
Lewin, Jean Piaget), and physicists (Paul Davies, Ernst Mach, Albert Einstein, Brian
Greene). Locke and Leibnitz, for example, argued that time and space comprise the
internal and inherent sequences of events located in the external world as we perceive it.
Kant maintained a somewhat similar opinion, arguing that time and space establish the
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boundaries within which all human perceptions are experienced and attain consciousness.
Furthermore, Kant viewed time as the form of “inner sense” while space was seen as the
form of “outer sense” in which all human consciousness takes place (Sherover, 1975).
Similar views were voiced by Alexander who regarded time and space as “ontologically
inseparable” (Sherover, 1975, p.175), together constituting the fundamental essence of
the universe, namely, space-time. He went on to suggest that whereas space is the
embodiment of stability and often even predictability, time is the creator of change,
novelty, development, and therefore, unpredictability.
CID implications. The most obvious implications of the concepts of time and
space to understanding CID stem from the work of Kurt Lewin (1936, 1943). Lewin’s
socio-psychological or “field” theory maintains that “any behavior or any other change in
a psychological field depends only upon the psychological field at that time (Lewin,
1943, p. 294, Italics in the original). Put differently, behavior refers to any change in the
psychological field. Behavior (B) at a certain time (T) is, then, a function of the
prevailing situation (S; at times referred to as E, the environment or the social
environment) at that time only. The psychological field, therefore, is comprised of one’s
simultaneous psychological past, present, and future (expectations, hopes, plans, fears,
wishes, etc.), as experienced at a given time. This present-focused “principle of
contemporaneity”, then, highlights the role of holistic interaction among simultaneous
events that in turn produce a unique effect on behavioral outcomes (Lewin, 1936).
These initial conceptualizations by Lewin were later applied to understanding the
psychology of CID through the work of Roger Barker, Tamara Dembo, Gloria Levitan,
and Beatrice Wright who collectively initiated the field of Somato-psychology during the
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early 1950’s. In their work, these researchers argued that the person with CID encounters
a more limited scope of his or her world (i.e., the world in which one functions becomes
smaller). And accordingly, the influences of overt behaviors are restricted to these of a
fewer number of people and physical conditions. They further claimed that future time
perspective may be affected by the nature of the chronic illness (acute vs. chronic, lifethreatening vs. non life threatening) and its associated functional limitations such that
acute and life threatening conditions, because of the urgency inherent in their very nature,
invariably limits one future time perspective and, therefore, the ability to engage in long –
term planning (Barker, Wright, Meyerson, & Gonick, 1953/1977).
A second application of the concept of space-time to CID can be found in the
work of Beatrice Wright (1983), whose perspectives on value changes during the
acceptance process of CID also invoke the concepts of temporality and the environment.
For example, Wright’s “transforming comparative values into asset values” suggests that
in order to successfully adapt to CID, a shift must occur whereby the person no longer
focuses on outer-directed past comparisons (oneself to others) and instead emphasizes
present strengths and abilities (inherent in oneself). Likewise, the “subordinating
physique” tenet suggests a shift from emphasizing physical normalcy and prowess (past –
oriented) to non-physical values (spiritual, social, cognitive) and pursuits (present- and
future-oriented).
Finally, a further conceptual implication, related to time and change, stems from
the work of Sprangers and Schwartz (1999; Schwartz & Sprangers, 1999) on “response
shift”. Briefly, response shift reflects changes in the meaning assigned by the individual
to self-assessment of certain psychological constructs such as quality-of-life (QOL).
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These changes may result from: (a) a change in the individual’s internal standards of
QOL measurement (i.e., scale recalibration); (b) a change in the individual’s values that
indicate a change in the relative importance assigned to various QOL domains; or (c) a
redefinition of the construct of QOL (re-conceptualization). It is beyond the scope of this
paper to address the finer elements of the “response shift” model (the reader may refer to
Bishop, Smedema, and Lee (2009) for a succinct yet excellent review of this model).
However, even from the above cursory overview of response shift it should be evident
that the concepts of time and change are dynamically interwoven into viewing how
people with CID assess re-assess their QOL (including its components of life satisfaction
and well-being) at different points throughout their lives following the onset of CID.
Time in the Context of Personality Theories and TherapeuticApproaches
The concept of time, albeit only rudimentary explored, is nevertheless inherent in
most personality and human behavior theories of the past one hundred years. The earlier
mentioned time-linked concepts of linearity vs. cyclicality, objectivity vs. subjectivity,
continuity vs. discontinuity, and reductionism vs. non-reductionism, can serve to better
grasp differences among the conceptual underpinnings of personality theories. In this
section, a brief description of several of the most prominent personality theories that
serve as a backdrop to much of the clinical underpinnings of rehabilitation counseling
and psychology practice as they, directly or indirectly, address time will be explored.
Psychoanalysis. The work of Freud and his early followers strongly emphasized:
1.

The supremacy of the past or antecedent personal life experiences, in
determining present cognitions, emotions, and perceptions. These are
reflective of the primacy accorded earlier unconscious determinants
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over later, consciously experienced events. Indeed, psychoanalytic
treatment modalities seek to actively induce regression in the client.
These modalities, further, refrain from setting time limits on the length
of treatment. Coupled with the “timeless atmosphere” espoused by the
free association technique, the client’s feelings and thoughts are
consistently oriented toward the past (Masler, 1973; Namnum, 1972).
2.

The existence of a continuous, temporal sequence of psychosexual
(Freud) and psychosocial (Erikson) stages of development.

3.

The gradual emergence of the ego, and later the superego, out of the
formless id. Freud (1915/1953) and Bonaparte (1940) further
maintained that the unconscious processes that are the hallmark of the
id are timeless. It is the emergence of the ego, and later the superego, as
autonomous systems of mental operations that are responsible for time
conceptualization. The experience and pace of perceived time have also
been linked to the lack of fulfillment of the id’s instinctual wishes (time
moves slowly) and the harshness of the superego demands and
expectations (time moves quickly) (Hartocollis, 1974, 1976; Rapaport,
1951; Slife, 1993).

These principles indicate that most forms of psychoanalytic-based theories regard
time as a linear, mostly objective, and generally continuous process (Slife, 1993;
Rapaport, 1951). More recent developments within the field of psychoanalysis, ego
psychology, and object relations, stemming from the contributions of such individuals as:
M. Mahler, H. Kohut, J. Bowlby, K. Horney, E. Fromm, D. Rapaport, and R. Spitz, cast a
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somewhat different light on the earlier, more orthodox conceptualizations. In these more
recent contributions, the role afforded to strict temporal determinism of human behavior
has been diminished and the objectivist view of childhood psyche has been rejected in
favor of a more subjectivist one. In other words, these views acknowledge the importance
of simultaneous, reciprocal influences of both interpersonal and environmental factors in
shaping behavior (Slife, 1993).
Psychoanalytic thinking posits that the origination of the sense of time can be
traced to the nature of the infant-mother relationships (Edlund, 1987; Hartocollis, 1974;
Mahler, 1975; Orgel, 1965; Rapaport, 1951; Schiffer, 1978). Furthermore, this imposed
postponement of maternally-triggered gratification signifies the infant’s first experience
of trauma and establishes the prototype for later experiences of trauma (Schiffer, 1978).
The periodicity inherent in the hunger (frustration, abandonment) and satiation
(gratification, stimulation) cycle that is linked to the absence or presence of the mother
establishes the prototype of time experience for the infant (Edlund, 1987; Rapaport, 1951;
Wallace & Rabin, 1960). The sense of subjective time, then, first emerges when the ego
becomes capable of differentiating between present needs and future anticipation
(Hartocollis, 1974). This acquired experience, therefore, creates a cyclical or pendular,
rather than a linear flow of time for the infant. These early subjective experiences of time
perception later pave the way to the development of a sense of objective time. The
gradual acquisition of a sense of objective time is further bolstered during the “anal
stage” of psychosexual development, during which the infant timing and increased
control over the excretory functions gradually signal ego control over both the passage of
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time and the external environment (Edlund, 1987; Fenichel, 1945; Freud, 1914/1953,
1915/1953).
Behavioral psychology. Orthodox behaviorism, as espoused by the work of
Skinner, is firmly rooted in the Lockian tradition that views time objectively and linearly.
It is based upon the Newtonian positivistic worldview and as such pays homage to time
reductionism (Stimulus → Response chains), linearity (past experiences determine
present behaviors), and temporal contiguity (environment antecedents directly influence
emitted behaviors) (Slife, 1993; Maddi, 1989). In contrast to psychoanalytic models that
espouse linear, temporal, stage-like, and psyche-based determinism, orthodox
behaviorism discounts the role played by the stage-like, psychological-triggered, and in
general, more complex models of linear time entrenched in the human mind. These
Behaviorist views, instead, tend to assign greater weight to the influence of existing (at
present) environmental-contextual factors and to more automated, psyche-free mediators
of behavior in the stimulus-behavior chains (Melges, 1982).
Cognitive psychology. Cognitive models of human functioning (including some
cognitive-behavioral theories such as those proposed by Albert Ellis, Aaron Beck, and
Albert Bandura), although still retaining some of the Newtonian time postulates,
nevertheless embrace Kantian philosophy and as such place more emphasis on the role
played by phenomenological aspects in influencing human experience. As such, these
models deviate from strict adherence to time’s objectivity and linearity and allow for
greater emphasis on subjective experience (the meditational role of cognitions) and
nonlinearity (present perceptions and future expectations may also impact how the past is
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being interpreted). As a result, the deterministic force inherent in the past is diminished
(Slife, 1993; Ford & Urban, 1998).
Humanistic and Existential Psychology. As espoused by the works of such
contributors as Carl Rogers, Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, Victor Frankel, Irving Yalom,
Medard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger and others, these views are derived from the Kantian
tradition. They, therefore, embrace the role that subjective time plays in influencing the
human experience. The belief in objective, as well as linear time is rejected in favor of
that of such concepts as synchronicity (i.e., influences on psychological phenomena and
processes can contemporaneous rather than solely past-determined), teleology
(perceptions and meanings of currents phenomena can be caused by future intentions and
goals), holism (the psyche or the internal world and the environment or the external
world are simultaneous components of a holistic context), and transcendence (human are
capable of self-transcendence and are able to exert their “free will” on the world), to
name just a few (Ford & Urban, 1998; Maddi, 1989; Rychlak, 1988; Slife, 1993). Put
differently, the role accorded to the past (and therefore to determinism) by earlier theories
is minimized if not outright dismissed. The emphasis is on the present moment with
acknowledgement of the potential contributions inherent in the future. Furthermore, it is
the present, as subjectively experienced, and even the future, as subjectively anticipated,
that exert influence on the past (Melges, 1982, Slife, 1993). Simple, reductionist, causeand-effect sequencing is denied. In a similar vein, the quantitative, continuous, and
universal nature of time is rejected in favor of non-continuous, largely qualitative (i.e.,
meaningful, holistic, transcendent) interpretation of time (Slife, 1993).
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In his detailed summary of the various psychological explanations that underlie
the temporal paradigms previously discussed, Slife (1993) contrasts the following
themes:
1.

The objectivity of time: Time as an objective standard for the
measurement of psychological experiences vs. time as a context-bound
experience where aspects of a dynamic past can be reconstructed from
both present beliefs, attitudes, and environmental antecedents as well as
expectations and hopes of the future.

2.

The continuity of time: Psychological change is continuous, and mostly
linear-like in nature vs. change is not a direct reflection of linear and
causal influences of past events and can often assume a discontinuous,
abrupt, and even chaotic (e.g., therapeutic insights, psychotic
breakdowns) nature.

3.

The linearity of time: Accurate explanations of present behaviors
require that antecedent determinants are unearthed and examined vs.
determinants of psychological processes and outcomes need not follow
linear reasoning but could be simultaneous in nature, such as when both
past experiences and future goals influence present perceptions and
behaviors. According to the latter view, then, humans are not passive,
simplistic or, at best, reactive agents to past events but instead can also
be active agents capable of certain degree of free will, individual
choice, self-transcendence, and are therefore holistic, complex beings.
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CID implications. Several implications of personality theory-driven concept of
time to people with CID are noteworthy. First, a careful review of time within the
psychodynamic model suggests: (a) the importance of the meaning of one’s past (prior to
onset of CID) as reconstructed in the present (following the onset of CID) and the
commensurate search for bringing pre-CID, unconscious meanings associated with
health, holism, disability, sickness, pain, etc. under conscious control; (b) focusing on the
process of mourning/grieving triggered by the loss of body parts and functions (pastoriented search reenacted in the present); and (c) paying attention to the symbolic
parallelism between present-experienced separation anxiety (stemming mostly from
bodily losses and removal from familiar environmental settings) and the prototypical
roots of anxiety associated with separation from parental figures and other libidinalinvested objects, as well as the often neglected yet potentially debilitating future-oriented
anxiety that could threaten future relationships. The process of adaptation to CID,
therefore, reflects a symbolic transition from a “normal” or “whole” body, one that
represented the past or the “former self”, into a new body, one that is indicative of the
present (the “present self”) and is no longer “complete” or “whole”. Such a transition first
requires acceptance of the loss and then a period of mourning for the lost of body
integrity before mental and affective energies can be reinvested in a new and
reconstructed self-image (Livneh & Siller, 2004; Slife, 1993).
Although spanning a wide range of models and therapeutic interventions, from the
more radical, orthodox, heavily-deterministic Skinnerian behaviorism that focuses
exclusively on stimulus-response chains of observable behaviors to the more socialcognitive model of Bandura that recognizes the important role played by cognitive
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mediating processes, the behavioral approach, nevertheless, still espouses the learning
model of human behavior. Also, since behavior is viewed as a function of its temporal
and contextual (i.e., spatial) contingencies, therapeutic and rehabilitation modalities
attempt to modify these earlier links by inducing novel temporal and contextual
contiguities (e.g., repetitious exposure to environmental stimuli in order to minimize
anxiety and avoidant behavior, re-enactment of behavioral chains to better master new
behavioral patterns, progressive reshaping of desired target behaviors through selective
schedules of reinforcement, remodeling of new actions, behaviors, and, if appropriate,
thoughts). In accordance with these principles, temporal implications to the
understanding the psychology of CID, as drawn from behavioral theory, suggest: (a) that
observed CID-linked behaviors such as social withdrawal or aggressive acts and, if
appropriate, inferred CID-associated thoughts, such as catastrophizing one’s condition or
developing failure-prone cognitions, are analyzed as to their temporal (past-oriented)
antecedents (trigger points) and contextually proximal (present-based) factors, both of
which are primed by the rehabilitation professional for direct manipulation and
reshaping; and (b) the need to apply techniques that seek to help the person with CID
“unlearn” past connections between specific environmental stimuli and behaviors that are
no longer appropriate or useful in the context of life with CID while at the same time
learn new connections that successfully link present environmental stimuli and
appropriately planned future behaviors, goals and plans (Slife, 1993; Stoll, 2004).
Cognitive models of human behaviors and intervention modalities often overlap
with those representing the social-cognitive pole of behavioral psychology (e.g., the
contributions of Dollard and Miller, Bandura, Rychlak). The seminal work of such
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individuals as Aaron Beck and Albert Ellis, however, deserves a mention on its own.
Cognitive models, in the context of life with CID, typically focus squarely on the
meditational role of cognitive schemata, such as belief systems and world views, as they
relate to the impact of CID-triggered changes on one’s life. Although both Ellis and Beck
advocate present-focused interventions, through the use of cognitive schemata to
reconstruct present perceptions, their models indicate the recognition of a pseudo-linear
chain of events, where the present “belief system” (e.g., the B in Ellis’ model) serves to
mediate events of the past (antecedents or A) and the future (consequences or C).
Moreover, since strict objective and linear temporal sequencing is rejected, and the
subjectivity of human experience is valued, by these models, the influence of the past in
these CID-triggered cognitive schemata is no longer viewed as the primary determinant
of present efforts to adapt to CID. Instead, present perceptions and anticipation of future
outcomes play a greater role in shaping cognitions and emotions that underlie the
individual’s efforts to cope with the aftermath of CID. Accordingly, CID-oriented
cognitive models suggest: (a) identification of present-focused dysfunctional or distorted
cognitions (again, failure-prone assumptions), stemming from the onset of CID, that
result in distressing emotions (e.g., anxiety, depression, anger) and maladaptive behaviors
(e.g., withdrawal, avoidance, hostile actions); (b) implementation of cognitive
restructuring and reframing interventions that seek to minimize presently-experienced
feelings of anxiety and depression as well as related catastrophizing tendencies; and (c)
assignment of homework activities to better plan for the future while taking into
consideration its inevitable uncertainty and lack of cognitive structure (Garske & Bishop,
2004; Slife, 1993; Swett & Kaplan, 2004).

21

Time and adaptation
The hallmark of humanistic and related phenomenological models of human
existence is their present orientation. The focus is on concerns and issues that the
individual (subjectively) experiences at the moment. With their departure from
Newtonian time constraints and the embracing of time as a synchronous, psychologicallyinfluenced, and transcendental entity, these models view present experiences and
phenomenological schemata as undeniably entrenched in past experiences as well as
future hopes and expectations. The very nature of transcending clock time bestows the
present with venues for freedom and choice and ultimately, the creation of meaning and
acceptance of responsibility for one’s actions (Rychlak, 1988, Slife, 1993). The
convenient separation of time into three distinct constituents of past, present, and future
is, therefore, rejected in favor of a holistic, interactive mode of perceiving the world and
coping with the experience of CID. As such, the influence of future meanings, hopes and
expectations on past recollections and perceptions must be explored and understood.
Psychosocial adaptation to CID is, accordingly, deeply entrenched in the individual’s
phenomenological field and subjectively perceived self-regard. CID-oriented humanistic
models therefore espouse: (a) the importance of present-focused phenomenological
contexts and moments that underlie one’s CID-triggered experiences that result in a
unique adaptation process where no two reactions (e.g., anxiety, depression, acceptance)
are alike, thereby nullifying any semblance of stage or phase theories of adaptation; (b)
the necessity, during therapeutic and rehabilitation discourses, of addressing existential
topics that often stem from the onset of CID and include anxiety, death, isolation, grief,
loneliness, and alienation; and (c) the need to carefully understand how the individual
assimilates the meaning attached to the nature and impact of CID at every moment, and
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how that ever-flowing search for meaning comes to influence perceptions of pain,
functional limitations and death (Ososkie & Holzbauer, 2004; Slife, 1993).
In sum, therefore, the above approaches, and other individual approaches not
discussed in the present context (e.g., Jung’s Analytical Therapy, Adler’s Individual
Therapy, Perls’ Gestalt therapy), with the possible exception of orthodox behaviorism,
recognize the importance of subjective time in shaping human perceptions, orientations,
and in general adaptation to life crises and misfortunes. Time flow, according to these
approaches, is marked by its contemporaneous, recursive, and interactive nature of its
constituents of past, present, and future. These various approaches, however, paint
different shades of the psychosocial adaptation to CID landscape, its ostensible linearity,
continuity, and universality. Yet, all these approaches recognize the relative importance
of the subjectivity of perceptions of past events, such as the onset, nature, context and
impact of the CID on one’s adaptive prowess. They also pay tribute to the complex, nonlinear, and often synchronous interaction between CID-triggered experiences and
perceptions borne out of the past and their assimilation the present. Finally, they all
acknowledge the capacity of future hopes, goals, and expectations (often referred to as
teleological determinants) to influence past recollections of the CID experience as well as
presently-assigned beliefs, meanings, cognitive schemata, and emotional tones.
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In Part II of this paper
Time and Death
Over half a century ago, Heidegger posited that the inevitability of death lays the
foundation to how humans perceive and experience time. Time has been described as
“the arch enemy of all living” (Doob, 1971, p. 92) and the “enemy of man” (Frank, 1939,
p. 293). Similarly, the American philosopher Dewey (1940) termed time as the
“destroyer” while Seymour (2002) maintained that bodily deterioration and its eventual
death are directly related to the flow of time. Time has also been reflected and
symbolized in mythical figures such as “Father Time”, “The Grim Ripper”, etc., and as
such has been both feared and hated (Ingram, 1979). It is of interest to also note that even
the world of physics, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, often referred to as the Law
of Entropy, indicates that all closed physical systems, with time, move into a greater state
of entropy (or increased amount of disorder). Put differently, this process indicates the
evolution of initially well-organized, dynamic systems (literally reflecting an active mode
of functioning) into disorganized, lifeless systems as time goes on (Davies, 1995; Greene,
2004).
Indeed, for humans and most organic (as well as inorganic) matter time is firmly
associated with decay and death. Time, therefore, is closely linked to the concept of
mortality. Whitrow (1972/2003) maintained that humans’ awareness of their own
mortality is linked to their existential anxiety of the passage of time and, therefore, is
closely aligned with the unpredictability of the future. Hans Reichenbach (1956) also
posited that an inescapable conclusion emanating from the irreversible flow of time is
that gradual approach of death. Accordingly, he suggested, death anxiety transforms itself
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into the fear of time. Similar sentiments were also expressed by Fraser (1975) who
posited that the passage of time is intimately associated with the inevitability but
unpredictability of death, thus necessitating mastery of future contingencies. The future
is, then, the harbinger of feelings of anxiety while the past is more likely to offer a safe
haven from such fears. The past, however, is not immune from lingering experiences of
anxieties as is commonly observed in such conditions as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
and Dissociative Identity Disorder (previously known as Multiple Personality Disorder).
Yet, the fact that death is an outgrowth of human (and all living things) existence
also suggests that death, being the negation of life, is therefore necessary for imbuing life
with significance, meaning, and direction (Minkowski, 1970). Furthermore, the insatiable
human need for denial of death (Becker, 1973, Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski,
1997; Rank, 1932/1989), is what facilitates living “in the present” while, at the same
time, planning for the future (Minkowski). Adopting a clinical view, Cohn (1957) and
Orgel (1961), suggest that the rigid rituals commonly seen in people with obsessivecompulsive disorders are a kind of “time machine” adopted to keep the notion of death in
abeyance, thus warding off the finality of life.
CID applications. The role that time plays in the context of death can be traced to
the notion that CID has been symbolically equated, at least in the psychodynamic
literature, with death and dying of certain body organs and functions (e.g., blindness as
the “death of eyesight”; paralysis-linked spinal cord injury as the “death of mobility”;
Chan, Livneh, Pruett, Wang, & Zheng, 2009; Livneh & Siller, 2004). If, indeed, certain
forms of CID are symbolically reflective of death, then it could be argued that the onset
of CID further nourishes the universal human fear of death and its symbolic association
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with normal aging and the passage of time. Although much of the available literature in
this field was spawned by research on attitudes toward people with CID, the very nature
of psychosocial adaptation to CID suggests that coping with the aftermath of lifethreatening medical conditions (e.g., cancer, heart disease) embodies the concept of time
and its psychological orientation. For example, the literature on coping with cancer
frequently contrasts the impact of two sets of coping strategies. At one extreme we find
fatalism (i.e., stoically accepting diagnosis and seeking no other information about
condition or making no plans to confront its implications) and helplessness/hopelessness
(i.e., engulfing oneself with the diagnosis and adopting a pessimistic attitude about
survival). At the opposing pole we find the strategy of fighting spirit (i.e., being
determined to fight illness by obtaining information and adopting optimistic attitude
about its eradication). Cancer survivors who have engaged in efforts to combat the
stressful impact of their condition, by demonstrating fighting spirit, have shown
remarkable resilience in the face of their often bleak diagnosis. They have coped with
their diagnosis and its implications by actively focusing on their present regimens and
pursuing future plans to minimize its impact on their lives. In contrast, those who have
passively accepted their condition as a “death sentence”, adopted a hopeless view of their
future, and lacked the will to actively cope with their condition, were unable or failed to
engage in present-focused efforts or set future goals to successfully combat their
condition. Their view of time appears to be past-focused (“I’ve had a good life”) and
future-truncated (“I avoid finding out more about it”) in its orientation (Greer & Watson,
1987; Watson, Greer, Rowden, Gorman, Robertson, Bliss, & Tunmore, 1991).
Time and Psychiatric Disorders
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A voluminous body of literature exists, that links time perception and/or time
orientation with psychiatric disorders. The distortion of time perceptions, be it a
contributing mechanism to the onset of psychiatric disorders, a correlate of their
manifestation, or a by-product of their nature, is nevertheless an integral part of their
symptomatology. This body of literature can conveniently be discussed under four
primary headings, namely (a) time perception and anxiety disorders, (b) time perception
and mood disorders (mostly depression), (d) time perception and psychotic disorders
(mostly schizophrenia and bipolar disorders), and (d) time perception and personality
disorders (mostly antisocial personality disorder) (Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Edlund,
1987; Melges, 1982; Rappaport, 1990; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008). It is beyond the scope
of this paper to fully address the rich literature that was aggregated over the past 60 years.
However, the present section seeks to provide the reader with a succinct overview of the
major concepts and empirical findings drawn from the available literature.
Time and anxiety disorders. It has been long thought that images of and
anticipation of future events carry profound influence on how individuals experience the
present (Barlow & Durand, 2009; Cottle & Klineberg, 1974; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008).
When life events render the future unpredictable, uncontrollable, and mostly foreboding,
increased levels of anxiety ensue and temporal integration is threatened (Cottle &
Klineberg, 1974; Maslow, 1962; Melges, 1982). Threat and anxiety are, therefore, futureoriented and efforts to manage anxiety may, therefore, focus on past time perception and
less on future time perception (Krauss & Ruiz, 1967). Empirical findings on the
relationships between time perception and anxiety are scarce but appear to lend some
support to these clinical observations. Krauss and Ruiz (1967) reported that scores on

28

Time and adaptation
anxiety were indeed negatively correlated with future time perception among hospitalized
psychiatric patients. Terr (1983), in a sample of 30 children and adults who experienced a
psychic trauma and exhibited a wide range of PTSD-related symptoms, found frequent
alterations in perception and memory of time duration and a pronounced belief in
foreshortened future perspective. Rappaport, Fossler, Bross, and Gilden (1993), reported
that in a sample of older individuals, future time orientation (in the form of seeking
meaningful and purposive future life possibilities) correlated negatively with death
anxiety, suggesting that in older individuals with lower levels of death anxiety the ability
to focus on the future was more intact.
Time and mood disorders. Symptoms of depression commonly include these of:
(a) Hopelessness and helplessness; (b) grief, mourning, and preoccupation with loss and
failure; and (c) psychomotor retardation that is typically experienced also as a significant
slowing of subjective time (Barlow & Durand, 2009; Edlund, 1987; Melges, 1982;
Wyrick & Wyrick, 1977; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008). Feelings of hopelessness point to a
truncated or blocked future (occasionally referred to as foreshortened or constricted
future time orientation; Gjesme, 1983; Melges, 1982). They also suggest disregard of
future plans and goals (Orbach, 1975). Feelings of grief and loss suggest a
disproportional focus on the past and its no longer available rewards. Brenner (1974) and
Rappaport (1990) further argue that, in contrast to those who experience anxiety (i.e., the
feeling that something bad is about to happen), people diagnosed with depression tend to
focus on the past (i.e., something bad has already happened) while consideration of a
positive past, and especially future, appears to be no longer a viable option to them. In a
similar vein, their estimation of the passage of time is often faulty, such that time is
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experienced to be passing too slowly. It is as if in depression the flow of time has slowed
appreciably, even ceased its perceived forward movement completely or is even
assuming a backward flow! (Rappaport). Empirical findings of these notions (Blewett,
1992; Dilling & Rabin, 1967; Gil & Droit-Volet, 2009; Melges & Fougerousse, 1966;
Tysk, 1984) indicate that the perception of the flow of time among people diagnosed with
depressive disorders is, indeed, slowed down and may be, further, directly correlated with
retarded psychomotor activity and altered level of physiological arousal.
Time and psychotic disorders. Psychotic disorders are commonly exemplified
by bipolar disorders and the various types of schizophrenic disorders. In the former group
of people with bipolar disorders, clinical reports (Edlund, 1987; Melges, 1982; Mezey &
Knight, 1965; Tysk, 1984; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008) have indicated that an opposite trend
to that observed in people with depression where subjective time estimates appear to
reflect the experience of rapid flow of time (e.g., racing thoughts) and an over-expansion
of future time orientation (i.e., the individual’s span of awareness into the future). The
latter group is marked by impaired reality testing, disorganized thinking and behavior,
and inappropriate affect. Melges (1982), as well as other researchers (e.g., Edlund, 1987)
of time perception among people with severe psychiatric disabilities argue that time
distortion in these populations may be at the root of the symptoms encountered among
people with these impairments. Entrenched in the symptoms that are associated with
psychotic disorders is the collapse of the past (e.g., recollection of prior events) and the
future (e.g., expectations of events) into the present. Present perceptions, therefore,
appear to be timeless, and they are all experienced as equally real (Melges). Moreover,
perceptions of inner events (recollections and expectations) are often confused with outer
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events (ongoing perceptions triggered by environmental-based stimuli and events)
(Melges). Time and space, as such, lose their defining dimensionality and are
experienced in a disintegrated, fragmented, and dysfunctional manner.
These distortions or disorganization of psychological (i.e., subjective) time
typically encompass distortions of rate (duration), estimation, sequencing (ordering) of
time, and temporal perspective. They are all manifestations of disorganized thinking
(Lehman, 1967; Melges, 1982; Melges & Freeman, 1977; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2008).
Indeed, the so called cognitive “primary processes”, those operating forces within the
unconsciousness, that we all encounter during dream sequences and that are characterized
by chaotic, diffuse, and disorganized mental images (unlike the more mature cognitive
“secondary processes” of well-organized, reality-oriented thinking), strongly mimic the
experience of timelessness noted in acute psychoses and infancy (Doob, 1971; Freud,
1933/1965; Masler, 1973; Melges, 1982). Empirical findings (Braley & Freed, 1971;
Densen, 1977; Dilling & Rabin, 1967; Johnson & Petzel, 1971; Melges, 1982; Wahl &
Sieg, 1980) indicated that for a large number of people diagnosed with schizophrenia: (a)
time was claimed to “stand still”; (b) clock and calendar time were inaccurately estimated
(often overestimated); (c) future time orientation, as compared to that of non-impaired
individuals, was of shorter duration, more incoherent, and mostly disorganized; and (d)
experiences of timelessness and personal time fragmentation were evident. These
manifestations of temporal disintegration have been observed in psychotic episodes such
as failing to properly index the past, accurately perceive the present, and logically
anticipate the future (Edlund, 1987; Melges, 1982). More recent research findings suggest
that time perception distortions may be linked to more generalized lack of temporal
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coordination in the brain and neuropsychological dysfunction (Carroll, Boggs,
O’Donnell, Shekhar, & & Hetrick, 2008; Carroll, O’Donnell, Shekhar, & Hetrick, 2009;
Lee, Bhaker, Mysore, Parks, Birkett, & Woodruff, 2009).
Time and sociopathic personality disorders. Over half a century ago Cleckley
(1959) maintained that criminals often fail in, and may even be incapable of, their efforts
to pursue long-term goals in an organized, well-orchestrated manner. Cleckley, therefore,
speculated that for these individuals a disruption in the processing of present needs and
wishes occurs which then interferes with the capacity to envision future consequences.
According to several theorists and clinicians (e.g., Melges, 1982; Smith, 1985; Wilson &
Herrnstein, 1985), sociopathic behavior is characterized by foreshortened future time
orientation or constricted “time horizon”. The present-oriented, impulsive efforts of
sociopaths (nowadays typically categorized under the most severely impaired individuals
with Antisocial Personality Disorder; APA, 2000), to obtain immediate gratification is
linked to their inability to anticipate future events along with their consequences (both
potential risks and rewards) (Melges, 1982). Empirical findings lent some support to
these notions. Hartocollis (1972), for example, reported that on projective tests (e.g.,
Rorschach, TAT) patients diagnosed with antisocial personality disorders displayed
limited awareness of time, most notably of the future and the past. Black and Gregson
(1973) also observed a shorter time perspectives in a sample of prisoners when compared
to a non-prisoner sample. Trommsdorff and Lamm (1980) observed that, among male
adolescent delinquents, future time orientation was less differentiated, less extended,
more pessimistic, and more internally-derived than that of non-delinquents. Lilienfeld,
Hess, and Rowland (1996), albeit in a sample of undergraduate students, found that
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measure of psychopathic personality/antisocial behavior were negatively correlated with
self-report measures of future time orientation, thus lending further support to prior
observations that antisocial tendencies may indeed be associated with the ability to
successfully process perceptions of the future .
Temporal Adaptation and coping
The concept of temporal adaptation has received only a scant treatment in the
fields of health, psychology, and rehabilitation. In its broadest sense it may be
conveniently regarded as occupying a continuum whose anchoring poles describe
successful temporal functioning vs. temporal malfunctioning (Cottle & Klineberg, 1974;
Kielhofner, 1977). The former pole refers to the capacity for a conscious, meaningful,
flexible and balanced integration of past experiences and future expectations into present
activities. The successful integration of these three temporal aspects is considered
paramount to the continuity of life activities and is informed, among other factors, by
situational necessities and available personal resources (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999, 2008).
In contrast, the latter pole reflects poor ability to integrate these temporal aspects and
results in unsuccessful efforts to organize life activities. It has also been extensively
implicated in the development and maintenance of various psychiatric disorders
(reviewed later in this paper).
Successful temporal adaptation is further imbued with such fundamental
concepts as change (vs. immutability), evolution (vs. stagnation), and dynamics (vs.
inertness). Indeed, its essence derives from the notion that adaptation is a continuous
process that requires various internal (e.g., emotional, cognitive) and external (i.e.,
environmental) life adjustments over time and is not a single instant, static concept
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(Vaillant, 1977; White, 1974). The capacity for temporal adaptation also suggests
successful coping behaviors with stressful life events and is associated with positive self
esteem (Zeidner & Saklofske, 1996). Although there have been many approaches to
viewing and classifying coping (e.g., Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989; Lazarus &
Folkman, 1984; Tobin, Holroyd, Reynolds, & Wigal, 1989), the notion of temporality
appears to fuel much of their content and functional ingredients. For example, in making
a distinction between coping and defensive processes while adopting a psychodynamic
approach, Haan (1977) argued that the ego processes inherent in defense mechanisms are
mostly past-propelled and distort those psychological facets required for present
functioning. In contrast, coping processes were viewed by her as future-oriented, while
taking account of present needs and the reality of the present situation. In a somewhat
similar manner, Nolen-Hoeksema and Larson (1994, 1999) carefully researched the nonadaptive emotional-focused coping strategy of “rumination” (hers is a different approach
to coping than Haan’s) and concluded that unmitigated rumination reflects “being stuck”
in the past rather than moving forward toward acceptance of the stressful situation (e.g.,
loss of a loved one). Put differently, it is those negative memories from the past that
result in viewing the present more negatively and in preventing active and adaptive
problem solving from combating depression. A final example of the intimate link
between coping and temporal orientation can be seen in the 5-tier phase classification of
coping. According to this classification (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; Folkman &
Moskowitz, 2004; Livneh & Martz, 2007; Schwarzer & Knoll, 2003), coping efforts can
be directed towards: (a) long range anticipated future events (preventive or proactive
coping) such as age-linked illnesses; (b) short range anticipated future events
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(anticipatory coping) such as awaiting the results of potentially life-threatening diagnosis;
(c) dynamic or crisis-like (present) situations such as facing intractable pain; (d) proximal
(immediate) past events (reactive coping) such as the aftermath of a recent car accident;
and (e) distal (remote) past events (residual coping) such as dealing with early life onset
CID. The above brief review of the temporal aspects of coping is only meant to alert the
reader to the importance of realizing the vital role that temporality plays in understanding
the functions and contexts of coping.
Time and psychosocial adaptation to CID
The subjectivity and relativity inherent in perceived (i.e., psychological) time are
markedly influenced by a host of personal experiences and environmental conditions,
including those associated with the onset, nature, progression, and treatment of CID
(Livneh & Martz, 2007). Following the onset or diagnosis of CID, the individual must
navigate among personal perceptions and recollections of the pre-CID past, current
cognitive schemata including coping modalities and novel biochemical, physiological and
physical experiences, as well as the uncertainty and unpredictability of the future. The
impingement of these perceptual, motivational, cognitive and affective experiences,
combine to impact time perception and orientation and, as a result, the process of
adaptation to CID. As discussed earlier in this paper, gradual deterioration of bodily
processes and functions, and ultimately the sentence of death, are inextricably linked to
the passage of clock time. The onset of CID, however, embodies an unexpected
discontinuity in the normal progress of physical aging (Seymour, 2002). CID, therefore,
disrupts the passage of both physical and psychological time, results in disorganization of
temporal adaptation, and is a concrete testament to the vulnerability of the human body
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(Keilhofner, 1975; Seymour, 2002). With its associative symbolism of death, time
assumes a far more urgent role in the lives of people with CID (Adam, 1990; Seymour,
2002). Indeed, Seymour maintained further that “living with a disability is living a life
dominated by time” (p. 138).
The notion that normal time flow is disrupted by the onset of CID further suggests
the following corollaries. First, with the disruption of the passage of time the individual’s
future time perspective, along with personal expectations, hopes, and wishes is likely to
undergo a foreshortened flow of time since the future is no longer a “safe place” for
psychological dwelling (Kielhofner, 1977; Lilliston, 1985). Second, with distorted time
flow, uncertainty about and unpredictability of one’s future, even the proximal future,
permeate the entire process of psychosocial adaptation to CID (Seymour, 2002). Third,
with the impact of traumatic CID, the subjective experience of time becomes mostly
present-oriented with time flow moving gradually slower (recall discussion of depression
and the perception of time). Further, leading to temporal disorientation are the often
associated experiences of pain, the disruption of the normal sleep/wake cycle, and
preoccupation with present bodily sensations and functions (Lilliston, 1985). Fourth, with
the resultant uneven temporal flow, the onset of sudden CID frequently leads to
distortions of “daily life spaces” because of both the amount of time that is now
demanded to accomplish daily activities and the imposed necessity for domestic, social,
and vocational changes (Keilhofner, 1977). Fifth, if following the aftermath of sudden
onset CID (e.g., SCI, TBI) treating the condition necessitates acute care environment, the
affected individual is likely to experience disorientation in time and space because of
severe mobility restrictions, continuous sensory deprivation, side effects of medication,
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and interrupted sleep-wake cycle associated with the dispensation of various medical
procedures and regimens (Trieschmann, 1988). Finally, since time can be regarded as the
mediator between past health status (e.g., wellness, physical intactness, order) and the
present CID (e.g., illness, disorder status, chaos), it is also capable of mediating between
present feelings of experienced emotional turmoil and the reconstruction of an ordered
and more controllable future. Indeed, the ensuing rehabilitation process following the
onset of CID may be viewed as the re-embracement of time (Adam, 1990, Seymour,
2002).
Unlike the large body of literature aggregated over the past several decades on the
relationships between time orientation and/or time perspective (the two are inexplicably
treated interchangeably in the empirical literature on CID) and psychiatric disabilities,
empirical data on time orientation and perspective, and psychosocial adaptation to
physical CID are scarce at best. In the following paragraphs an attempt is made to
summarize these findings. Before doing so, however, it is important that the reader
becomes acquainted with those instruments typically applied to measuring time.
The two most frequently used measures are (a) the Zimbardo Time Perspective
Inventory (ZTPI; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999), and the Future Time Orientation Scale
(FTOS; Gjesme, 1979). The former measure is a 56-iten questionnaire that is composed
of five scales that depict the respondent’s preference for experiences that are temporallyrelated (past, present, or future time). Past perspective is divided into two scales, namely,
Past Negative (i.e., reflecting an aversive view of the past) and Past positive (i.e.,
indicating a positive recollection of the past). Present perspective is also broken town into
scales. These are Present Fatalistic (i.e., characterized by resignation toward fate and
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holding mostly a negative orientation toward the present), and Present Hedonistic (i.e.,
depicting a pleasure-oriented, risk-taking attitude toward present life). Finally, the Future
scale reflects a goal-oriented attitude toward the future. The second measure, FTOS, is a
14-item instrument that focuses on the respondent’s general concern and personal
involvement with the future. Lower scores are typically indicative of foreshortened sense
of future while higher scores suggest greater orientation toward the future. In addition to
these two measures, other instruments have been also infrequently used to address
temporal orientation. These include researcher-developed (a) projective scales such as
story telling/writing measures, and (b) ad hoc temporally-constructed items selected
specifically for that study.
Past time orientation/perspective and adaptation to CID. As discussed above,
according to Zimbardo and Boyd (1999, 2008), past time orientation can take the form of
either positive or negative valence****. Two studies reported findings on the relationship
between scores on the ZTPI and psychosocial adaptation to CID. Hamilton, Kives,
Micevski, and Grace (2003), in a sample of older people with cardiac disease, reported
that participants who scored higher on positive past orientation also engaged in more
health-promoting lifestyle activities and experienced higher levels of spiritual growth. In
contrast, those individuals who scored higher on negative past orientation coped poorly in
managing their stress. In a sample of people with diabetes, Livneh and Martz (2007)
found that positive past orientation was associated with lower levels of anxiety and
depression and also with higher levels of psychological adjustment, while negative past
orientation was related to higher levels of depression and anger. Finally, in a
comprehensive study that sought to examine temporal orientation among people who
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experienced major life traumas (i.e., adult women who experienced childhood incest, war
veterans, and survivors of fire-damaged residences), and using responses to open-ended
semi-structured questionnaire, Holman and Silver (1998) reported that participants who
were past-oriented, also experienced higher levels of distress. An additional observation
of interest was that past orientation was linked to temporal disintegration at the time of
the traumatic experience. Put differently, those for whom, during the traumatic insult,
present perceptions were isolated from both the past and the future (and thus experienced
interference with normal assimilation of the traumatic event into their ongoing mental
processes) were found to be “stuck” in the past and experience higher levels of distress.
Present time orientation/perspective and adaptation to CID. As discussed, present
time orientation has also been divided into two separate, affectively-based dimensions by
Zimbardo and Boyd (1999, 2008), namely, pleasure-oriented or hedonistic and
resignation-oriented or fatalistic. In their study, Hamilton et al. (2003) found that among
cardiac rehabilitation patients present hedonistic orientation was positively associated
with health-promoting practices and more intimate interpersonal relations. Livneh and
Martz (2007), investigating the relationships between time orientation and psychosocial
adaptation in a sample of people with diabetes, reported that hedonistic present
orientation was positively and significantly related to successful adjustment while
fatalistic present orientation was positively and significantly linked to measures of
anxiety, depression and anger, and negatively to psychological adjustment. Using items
derived from the Hypertension Temporal Orientation scale (Brown & Segal, 1996), and
adopting these items to experiences by individuals diagnosed with osteoarthritis, Alberts
and Dunton (2008) examined the relationships between time orientation and illness
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management strategies. Results demonstrated that among older women with
osteoarthritis, focus on the present was associated with less proactive illness management
coping (i.e., fewer efforts at planning for future benefits) and greater reliance on reactive
coping strategies to manage the illness and its symptoms (i.e., focusing mostly on
immediate benefits to remove threats and improve symptoms).
Future time orientation/perspective and adaptation to CID. FTO guides many of
our psychological processes and functions and is further associated with the development
and maintenance of mental health, life satisfaction and perceived well-being (Holman &
Silver, 1998; Lewin, 1943; Melges, 1982). Reasonable FTO affords the individual the
ability to engage in preparatory behaviors during the present; however when the
individual’s focus is on the highly remote future the needed present urgency and potency
of planning for the future may be lost (Frank, 1939). FTO may not represent a unitary
construct but may be comprised of at least two independent aspects, namely, extension
and coherence (Wallace & Rabin, 1960). Whereas the former refers to the quantitative
length or span of projected FTO, the latter refers to the logical structure or organization
of anticipated events during the future. Three essential factors that have been introduced
to explain FTO development include: motives (motivational), delay of gratification
(impulse control/affective), and ability to use symbols to conceptualize the future
(cognitive) (Gjesme, 1983; Heckhausen, 1977; Nuttin, 1985). FTO, then, refers to the
degree of involvement in the future; it is a set of subjective expectations and beliefs about
one’s future.
In one of the earliest studies that sought to examine the role played by FTO in
coping with CID, Agrawal and Pandey (1998) obtained data from a sample of 22 women

40

Time and adaptation
diagnosed with a variety of chronic conditions including cancer, diabetes, cardiovascular
diseases, and asthma. FTO was assessed with a combined approach of story writing
technique and a semantic differential scale. Results showed that FTO was positively
related to measures of optimism, life satisfaction and adaptive coping strategies (e.g.,
acceptance, planning, positive reinterpretation). Similar findings were reported by
Anubhuti (2008), also using a semi-projective technique of story writing to assess FTO.
In that study, 30 individuals with Type II diabetes provided data on quality of life (QOL)
and life satisfaction. Those who with higher scores of FTO also reported high levels of
life satisfaction and perceived social support (one of the QOL measure subscales). The
author interpreted these findings as suggesting that the cognitive and motivational aspects
of FTO are associated with such personal attributes as hope and optimism, thus resulting
in greater perceived life satisfaction.
In their study of individuals who underwent cardiac rehabilitation, Hamilton et al.
(2003) reported that those who scored higher on the ZTPI Future Scale also engaged in
more responsible health promoting behaviors. This relationship, however, was no longer
statistically significant once socio-demographic variables (e.g., chronological age) were
controlled for. The authors posited, based on the totality of their findings, that the reason
FTO failed to successfully predict indicators of psychosocial adaptation to cardiac
condition (i.e., spiritual growth, stress management and interpersonal relations) stems
from the fact that the daily stressful experiences typically associated with cardiac disease
and the accompanying threat to life, truncate both future and present time perspectives,
and concomitantly increase cognitions about the past. This increased attention to the past
is seen as reflective of efforts to reaffirm feelings of intrinsic value of one’s life,
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especially among elderly cardiac populations. Martz (2004) studied psychosocial
predictors of FTO among 317 veteran and civilian with SCI. Her results indicated that the
three most salient predictors were those of depression (associated with foreshortened
FTO), shock (defined as experiencing feelings of psychic numbness and disorganization
during the time of the injury; associated with foreshortened FTO), and acknowledgement
(defined as cognitive acceptance of disability; associated with lengthened FTO). In a
related study, Martz and Livneh (2003), analyzing data from the same sample of SCI
survivors, further found that truncated FTO was also predicted by increased levels of
death anxiety and experienced pain after controlling for the influence of sociodemographic (i.e., gender, age, marital status, education) and disability-related (i.e.,
existence of pressure sores, duration of disability) variables.
Chalfant, Bryant, and Fulcher (2004) examined the prevalence of PTSD in a
sample of 58 individuals diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. Although no specific time
orientation measures were directly used, from their access to participants’ audiotaped
reports, the authors categorized re-experiencing symptoms as either past- or futureoriented. Results showed that a foreshortened sense of future orientation was the most
predictive symptom of PTSD in this sample. The authors argued that individuals with MS
who are threatened by their unpredictable medical condition may also be susceptible to
experiencing PTSD. Research based on a sample of 105 individuals diagnosed with
diabetes by Martz and Livneh (Martz & Livneh, 2007; Livneh & Martz, 2007), further
demonstrated that FTO is negatively related to feelings of anxiety, depression and also
anger, while positively associated with successful psychosocial adjustment to SCI.
Moreover, FTO was also found to be negatively correlated with all three subscales (re-
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experiencing, hyper-arousal, and avoidance) of the Purdue Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder-Revised (PPTSD-R) Scale (Lauterbach & Vrana, 1996), although only scores
from the latter subscale reached statistical significance level. Finally, in their study of
women with osteoarthritis, Alberts and Dunton (2008), findings revealed that women
scoring higher on FTO engaged in more planned proactive and preventive behaviors to
manage their illness and resorted to fewer reactive efforts at illness management (focused
less on only immediate symptom reduction).
Treatment Modalities and Time Distortions
Reactions of depression and anxiety have been frequently reported to be a linked
to the onset of CID (Lee, Chan, Chronister, Chan, & Romero, 2009; Livneh & Antonak,
1997; Shontz, 1975). As was discussed earlier, these reactions are often associated with
distortions of both past and future time perceptions. To combat disordered time
orientations and perceptions, several approaches have been suggested in the literature.
These include:
1. “Unfreezing the Future” (Melges, 1982, chapter 9). This approach is directed at
helping depressed clients focus more on the immediate present and the near
future. The client is directed toward combating his or her feelings of hopelessness
and, in general, inducing positive expectations about the future into their
cognitive schemata.
2. Time projection (Melges, 1982, chapter 6). Having the client project thoughts into
the past (by reliving certain past life episodes), but especially toward the future
(by visualizing specific future time frames as if they were occurring at the
moment), can be beneficial in helping the client to gain a more comprehensive
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temporal perspective on the source of his or her difficulties and their possible
future ramifications.
3. Temporally-oriented psychotherapy (Rappaport, 1990). This approach, although
only rudimentary developed and borrowing heavily from other psychodynamic
therapeutic modalities, attempts to integrate all three time zones (i.e., it is based
on the premise that temporal zones form “irreducible synergism” (Rappaport, p.
189). As such, it addresses all temporal zones in concert, typically by first
focusing on the client’s current life issues and then proceeding forward (i.e.,
“unblocking the future”) and backward (uncovering sources of anxiety,
depression, etc.).
4. Temporal awareness shifting (Silver, Boon, & Stones,1983). With the use of this
approach clients are directed to learn how to consciously shift attention away
from distressing past life events and replace them with focused outlook on present
opportunities for growth in order to maximize adaptive functioning.
5. Proactive illness management (Alberts & Dunton, 2008). Individuals who are
mostly present-oriented could benefit from a therapeutic approach that is geared
toward managing their CIDs more proactively. Included in this approach are such
venues as focusing on future benefits and on important life goals yet to be
accomplished.
Conclusion
A review of the available theoretical, clinical and empirical literatures on time and
psychosocial adaptation to CID suggests the following. First,
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*No elaboration on the scientific accuracy of the concept of “Newtonian” or linearlyrigid time is pursued in this paper. As most readers are well aware of, “Einstein’s
time”, first espoused by him during his “Special Theory of Relativity”, introduced the
concept that the flow of time is relative to the observer and to his or her motion
within space such that time slows down as a function of the observer’s increased
speed (Davies, 1995). Furthermore, time also slows down as a function of increased
force of gravity (“General Theory of Relativity”), such that time comes to a virtual
standstill in the presence of enormous gravity pull as is experienced in the vicinity of
such objects as black holes.
** The “big bang” and its companion the “big crunch” models are based on cyclical,
repetitive assumptions of time progression while the “heat death” model is anchored
in the belief that the universe will continue its expansion forever, resulting in a state
of maximum entropy.
***Although implied in both sets of models is the notion of temporal evolvement,
neither model fully addresses the notion of spacetime and certainly both are remiss in
incorporating spatial elements into their theoretical fabric. Other models, notably
termed “ecological”, “interactive” or “reciprocal” models (for review the reader may
consult such sources as Livneh & Parker, 2005, Livneh & Bishop, 2011, and
Smedema et al., 2009) are more cognizant of environmental influences and their role
in psychosocial adaptation to CID.
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****Although this harsh dichotomy appears at first blush to be a bit unsettling and
simplistic, in the context of the ZTPI’s continuous scoring on each of these
scales/dimensions a more realistic view of each time orientation is achieved.
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